"...a challenging and important work...in this key area of interdisciplinary research, Alesina and Rosenthal's multi-faceted formal arguments and empirical tests are likely to set the standard for many years." Keith Krehbiel, Stanford University

"Alesina and Rosenthal bring together two major themes in the current study of American politics--divided government and the political business cycle. In so doing, they develop a theoretically innovative, statistically well-grounded model of the United States political economy. A strong round of applause is in order." Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Professor, the University of Iowa

"Alesina and Rosenthal have made what will surely be an enduring contribution....This book represents a genuine advance in the political business cycle literature....This book is accessible and holds value for both economists and political scientists. It should prove very useful to graduate students, but will also be stimulating to readers who are already familiar with the existing literature on political business cycles. This book would make a nice addition to a graduate seminar on applied political economy; any course which covers political business cycles would be incomplete absent this book as a required text." Jeffrey Milyo, Journal of Politics

This book develops an integrated approach to understanding the American economy and national elections. Economic policy is generally seen as the result of a compromise between the President and Congress. Because Democrats and Republicans usually maintain polarised preferences on policy, middle-of-the-road voters seek to balance the President by reinforcing in Congress the party not holding the White House. This balancing leads, always, to relatively moderate policies and, frequently, to divided government. The authors outline the rational partisan business cycle, where Republican administrations begin with recessions, and Democratic ones with expansions, and the midterm cycle, where the President's party loses votes in the midterm congressional election. The book argues that both cycles are the result of uncertainty about the outcome of presidential elections. Other topics covered include retrospective voting on the economy, coat-tails, and incumbency advantage.
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Integrates economics and politics, theory and econometrics, to provide the first coherent and general formal model of US political economy. Addresses formal tests of rationality in voting behaviour and rational voter behaviour when the executive and legislature are chosen simultaneously.
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1. Introduction; 2. Models of policy divergence; 3. A theory of institutional balancing; 4. The midterm cycle; 5. Diversity, persistence, and mobility; 6. Incumbency and moderation; 7. Partisan business cycles; 8. The President, Congress, and the economy; 9. Economic growth and national elections in the United States: 1915–88; 10. Partisan economic policy and divided government in parliamentary democracies.
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Integrates economics and politics, theory and econometrics, to provide the first coherent and general formal model of US political economy.

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780521436205
Publisert
1995-01-27
Utgiver
Vendor
Cambridge University Press
Vekt
460 gr
Høyde
228 mm
Bredde
153 mm
Dybde
23 mm
Aldersnivå
P, 06
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Heftet
Antall sider
300