How does Vladimir Putin retain power? Through charisma, coercion, corruption—and a constitution! Will Partlett shows that the Russian constitution matters to sustaining the power centralized in Putin’s presidential office by adding legal authority to other power bases. Partlett offers us more than a detailed study of the constitutional centralization of power in Russia’s presidency. He takes on an important argument in political theory for centralized power as a vehicle for promoting the public good while preserving democratic rights, by overcoming the toned down versions of Hobbes’s war against all that are manifested in some pluralist political systems, immobilized by petty disagreements among power-seeking politicians. Partlett argues that, though the centralizers are sometimes correct in their diagnoses of their polities’ problems, their prescription runs high risks of degenerating into mere authoritarianism, risks manifested in Russia’s post-1989 experience from Boris Yeltsin though Putin. Partlett does an important service to the field of comparative constitutional law, and liberal political theorys by placing the case for centralized power back on the table even as he ends up severely criticizing it.

Mark Tushnet, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard Law School, USA

Partlett’s book is a masterpiece that will significantly shape understanding of Russian constitutional law and politics, the role of law in autocratisation and democratisation, and the nature of constitutions. It will have a far-reaching and lasting impact. It could not be more timely, given the growing effects of Russian authoritarianism and the rise and resilience of authoritarianism worldwide. The book is written in beautiful and accessible language, and I highly recommend it to you all.

Cora Chan, Professor Hong Kong University Faculty of Law and Director of the Centre for Comparative and Public Law