This work is a critical discussion of the principle of compositionality. It aims to clarify what is meant by this principle, show that its traditional justification is insufficient, and to discuss some of the problems to be addressed.

Preface; 1. The Principle; 1.1. Statement of the Principle; 1.2 Alternative Formulations; 1.3 Parallelism; 1.4 Substitutivity; 1.5 Functionality; 1.6 Summary; 2. Linguistic Semantics; 2.1 Is Semantics Empirical; 2.2 The First Dogma; 2.3 The Second Dogma; 2.4 Semantics without Epistemology; 2.5 Semantics without Ontology; 2.6 The Third Dogma; 2.7 Summary; 3. The Argument; 3.1 The Argument from Understanding; 3.2 Meaning and Understanding; 3.3 The Strong Principle of Understanding; 3.4 The Modest Principle of Understanding; 3.5 Understanding and the Missing Shade of Blue; 3.6 Summary; 4. Adjectives in Context; 4.1 The Context Thesis; 4.2 The Color of a Painted Leaf; 4.3 Problems of 'Good'; 4.4 Ways of Being Good; 4.5 Varieties of Incompleteness; 4.6 Ways of Being Green?; 4.7 Summary; 5. Descriptions in Context; 5.1 A Parallel; 5.2 Referring and Quantifying Phrases; 5.3 Two Objections to the Quantificational View; 5.4 Replies to Donnellan's Objection; 5.5 Replies to Heim's Objection; 5.6 Methodological Considerations; 5.7 Coreferring Phrases and File-Cards; 5.8 Summary; 6. In Place of a Conclusion; Bibliography; Index