This book reveals the nature and level of British engagement with controversial and lethal nerve agent weapons from the end of the Second World War to Britain’s submission of a draft Chemical Weapons Convention.

Chapter 1. Introduction.- Chapter 2. British Defence Policy and the Nerve Agents in Postwar Britain, 1945–1950.-Chapter 3. A Step Too Far: The Nerve Agents and the Global Strategy Paper, 1951–1953.- Chapter 4. Drift, Decline, and a Stubborn Prime Minister, 1954–1957.- Chapter 5. Another Reverse Course: From Dependence to Acquisition, 1958–1963.- Chapter 6. A ‘Secret Deterrent’ and a ‘Campaign of Criticism’, 1964–1969.- Chapter 7. From the CS Debacle to the Rise of CW disarmament, 1970–1976.- Chapter 8. Conclusion: From Discovery to Disarmament.

“Nerve agents in Postwar Britain presents a fascinating history of the twists and turns of the UK’s policy on chemical weapons.”—Hassan Elbahtimy, Senior Lecturer, War Studies Department, King's College London, UK“This is a compelling story. The archives King has analysed show British ministers and officials in frequent discomfort, torn between military secrecy and public scrutiny, never sure what nerve agent capabilities the other side held or how best to deter their use in war.”—Nicholas Sims, Emeritus Reader in International Relations, The London School of Economics and Political Science, UK"King’s thoroughly researched and ground-breaking account charts the development of nerve agent policy in the UK from 1945 to 1976. His work not only fills a significant gap in the history of chemical warfare, but will be invaluable for understanding UK Cold War defence policy more generally."—Brian Balmer, Professor of Science Policy Studies, Department of Science & Technology Studies, University College London, UKThis book reveals the nature and level of British engagement with controversial and lethal nerve agent weapons from the end of the Second World War to Britain’s submission of a draft Chemical Weapons Convention. At the very heart of this highly secretive aspect of British defence policy were fundamental questions over whether Britain should acquire nerve agent weapons for potential first-use against the Soviet Union, retain them purely for their deterrence value, or drive for either unilateral or international chemical weapons disarmament. These considerations and concerns over nerve agent weapons were not limited to low-level defence committees, nor were they consigned to the periphery, but featured prominently at the highest levels of the British government and defence planning. Importantly, and despite stringent secrecy, the book further uncovers how public scrutiny and protest movementsplayed a substantial and successful part in influencing policy and attitudes towards nerve agent weapons. William King is a Research Fellow at the German Historical Institute London, UK.   

“I warmly recommend this insightful account of how the United Kingdom tangled with the moral and military dilemmas thrown up by nerve agents, before deterrence finally gave way to disarmament as the UK's preferred policy regarding chemical weapons.  It is a compelling story.  The archives Dr King has analysed show British ministers and officials in frequent discomfort, torn between military secrecy and public scrutiny, never sure what nerve agent capabilities the other side held or how best to deter their use in war.  Dr King handles this material with great skill and fidelity to the historical record.  The result is a convincing account of how intelligence assessors, scientists and politicians interacted to determine British policy on nerve agents, against a background of US-UK defence cooperation and Cold War fears of chemical attack; and all this before we had to worry about Novichok.” (Nicholas Sims, Emeritus Reader in International Relations, The London School of Economics and Political Science, UK)  “Nerve agents in Postwar Britain presents a fascinating history of the twists and turns of the UK’s policy on chemical weapons. Through reliance on archival research in the UK and beyond, it provides new and original insights into the dynamics of secrecy and publicity, bureaucratic wrangling and international politics that are key to understanding the backstory of UK policy towards chemical weapons. The book also sheds new light on the roles played by Anthony Eden, Harold Wilson and Chief Scientific Advisor Solly Zuckerman, as well as anti-chemical weapons campaigners, in influencing and shaping UK chemical weapons policy.” (Hassan Elbahtimy, Senior Lecturer, Department of War Studies, King's College London, UK) “King’s thoroughly researched and ground-breaking account charts the development of nerve agent policy in the UK from 1945 to 1976, starting with the discovery of German stocks of G-agents at the end of WWII and culminating in the decision by the Chiefs of Staff to abandon a long-standing call for a retaliatory nerve agent capability.   His work not only fills a significant gap in the history of chemical warfare, but will be invaluable for understanding UK Cold War defence policy more generally.” (Brian Balmer, Professor of Science Policy Studies, Department of Science & Technology Studies, University College London, UK)  “William King has written an important book, rooted in official sources and commendable in its coverage of debates among U.K. policy-makers. It adds to the existing literature on the history of Britain’s engagement with chemical warfare (CW) by reviewing how policy evolved in the wake of the Second World War, an era dominated by the emergence of nerve agents. It reviews not only how the U.K. contributed to the pioneering research and development but also how strategic and operational thinking evolved in a cold war, where nuclear weapons became the critical ordnance in national and allied deterrence. It shows how British policy-making took account of allied collaboration, which had its origins in the Second World War, and of acute political sensitivities about the discussion of CW issues. Above all, it focuses upon the debates about whether the U.K. should renounce its offensive CW capability to rely upon the nuclear deterrent and the pursuit of CW disarmament.” (Edward M. Spiers, Emeritus Professor, University of Leeds, UK)

Explores the controversy over the role and place of nerve agent weapons in the three decades after World War II Reveals both closed-door debates between officials and politicians, as well as public scrutiny Situates this engagement with nerve agent weapons within a broader framework of British politics and defence policy during the Cold War

GPSR Compliance The European Union's (EU) General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR) is a set of rules that requires consumer products to be safe and our obligations to ensure this. If you have any concerns about our products you can contact us on ProductSafety@springernature.com. In case Publisher is established outside the EU, the EU authorized representative is: Springer Nature Customer Service Center GmbH Europaplatz 3 69115 Heidelberg, Germany ProductSafety@springernature.com