"Robert Nichols' basic idea is an interesting one: viewing Foucaults 'care of the self' as a successful historicizing of Heidegger's existential analytic of care offers us a powerful alternative to the 'prevailing (Kantian) tradition['s problematic] model of freedom as autonomous rational willing.' . . . [He] provides clear and thoughtful reconstructions of Heidegger's and Foucault's attempts to develop a situational account of freedom, while engaging some other, in Nichols' view, less successful attempts by Herbert Marcuse and Axel Honneth to develop Heideggerian alternatives to the prevailing Kantian tradition . . . There is much to learn from Nichols' account of Foucault's historical ontology and how it leads us to a more politically helpful understanding of freedom. Similarly, many will be interested in how Nichols reads Foucault along with Heidegger, showing how each helps us to understand the other."—Alan D. Schrift, <i>Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews</i>

"Robert Nichols makes a powerful case for reading the late Foucault in the light of Heidegger's conception of freedom. His masterful demonstration of their convergences not only shows how Foucault's historical ontology of human subjectivity complements Heidegger's account of the historicity of Being, it transforms our understanding of the political significance of Foucault's genealogies. <i>The World of Freedom</i> is a valuable contribution to Heidegger scholarship, Foucault studies, and to the understanding of key Continental political philosophical concepts."—Paul Patton, University of New South Wales

"This book breaks new ground in an underdeveloped area of both Foucault and Heidegger studies and advances current debates within critical theory. While clearly appreciating Foucault's departures from Heidegger, Robert Nichols makes the case that Foucault and Heidegger share an understanding of freedom as an ethical relationship to our world of practical engagements. Moving beyond comparative exegesis, he argues that Foucault's later writings on 'spiritual' practices of the self offer a more compelling critical response to the problem of reification than Hegelian appeals to recognition."—Jana Sawicki, Williams College