The problem of consciousness is central to the perennial philosophical debate on the relation between mind and body; Robert Kirk offers a penetrating analysis of the problem, and suggests a new approach to solving it. He uses the notion of `raw feeling' to bridge the gap between our knowledge of ourselves as physical organisms and our knowledge of ourselves as subjects of experience.

Part 1 Raw feeling and the intelligibility gap: Anna; problems; the plot; relational accounts and the infinite regress objection; Jackson's defence of a relational analysis; states, processes and ontology; bundle theories; epiphenomenalism; behaviourism; a rough fix on raw feeling. Part 2 Is the notion sound: Wittgenstein and the inverted spectrum; does raw feeling fall foul of the private language argument?; anti-realism about sensation language; how we can know what others' raw feels are like; beetles in boxes and transformation; a brain in a vat; can raw feeling be "quined"?; eliminativism in general. Part 3 Strict implication and the Swiss cheese principle: the zombie idea; the two-stage creation scenario and the strict implication thesis; more on the strict implication thesis; absolute impossibility and the example of "gnarled"; what has to be done?; neurone replacement therapy - will it work?; the Swiss cheese principle; some general points about the nature of mental life; the core argument; Cartesian resistance; we may assume the strict implication thesis is true. Part 4 Perceptual information: pure stimulus-response systems; the basic package; the machine-table robot; the realistic construal of information being for the system; the GIANT; the richness of perceptual information; perceptual information and consciousness; help from connectionist models. Part 5 Conscious subjects: the stickleback; more on "directly active" information; how the stickeback's internal processes have characters for it; the stickleback as conscious subject; no further cognitive sophistication is required; language is not necessary; blindsight; why there coudn't be zombies; is consciousness all-or-nothing?; subjects of raw feeling. Part 6 The character of raw feeling; what seems to be the trouble; why the bald identity theory won't help; failure of the "inner sense" approach; the inverter operation; shoemaker's martians; a structure of contrasts; what determines which way round?; alternative vision; where does this leave functionalism. Part 7 The gap has been bridged: is there still a mystery?; the inverted spectrum strikes again - or does it?; the question of necessary connection; an impossible requirement; Nagel's challenge; the argument from knowledge; "facts beyond the reach of human concepts"; "the real nature of human experience"; a last look at the intelligibility gap.