the reader who ventures to follow Travis along the lines of argument contained in these essays will be rewarded with rich reflections on some of the most central topics in epistemology and the philosophy of mind.
James Genone, Mind
a stimulating and original contribution to many debates in contemporary philosophy of perception. Travis's rehabilitation of Fregean anti-psychologism is a welcome and timely development . . . this collection presents a coherent and impressive case against the prevailing representationalist consensus, and is perhaps best read as setting the agenda for an alternative, non-representational understanding of perceptual psychology and the metaphysics of mind and consciousness. As such, philosophers of mind, language and perception will find much of interest here, both in terms of building upon Travis's previous work, and in opening up new lines of enquiry in the debates about perceptual content, representation and disjunctivism.
Keith A. Wilson, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews