This book is an empirically informed investigation of the philosophical problem of mental causation, and a philosophical investigation of the status of cognitive scientific generalisations. Second, we show how statements using these are not reducible to statements about physical kinds, involving biological and social facts.

This book is an empirically informed investigation of the philosophical problem of mental causation, and a philosophical investigation of the status of cognitive scientific generalisations. If there are mental causes which can be classified in a way useful for predicting and explaining, then they are natural kinds. First. we develop an account of natural kinds that accommodates the cognitive. Second, we show how statements using these are not reducible to statements about physical kinds, involving biological and social facts. Finally, Virtual Machine Functionalism is defended as the correct account of the relationship between cognition and the material world.

“In this compelling treatment, philosopher and cognitive scientist Simon Bowes shows us how we can be both purely physical beings and beings who act for reasons. He shows how our reasons can be causes, and how mind and self emerge from looping organism-environment interactions. Exciting and important, this is essential reading for anyone interested in mind, agency, and action.” (Andy Clark ,Professor of Cognitive Philosophy, University of Sussex, UK)

“This thoroughly excellent, informative, and much needed book is a persuasive argument for the autonomy of both folk psychology and cognitive psychology. It is also an empirically grounded argument for explanatory pluralism and cooperation in cognitive science, as opposed to endless hegemonic battles between seemingly mutually exclusive "isms." To wit, Bowes defends a version of Virtual Machine Functionalism that plausibly unifies and synthesizes aspects of embodied cognition as well as various brain-centric accounts from cognitive neuroscience. An integrated and multifaceted account of mental causation, intentionality, and phenomenal consciousness is provided that shows how progress and consensus might be possible in the highly contentious realm of cognitive science.” (Michael Silberstein, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Cognitive Science Program, Elizabethtown College, USA)

“With humor and wit, this book develops fresh perspectives on classic themes of analytic philosophy of mind, in particular regarding the problem of mental causation. Starting from the position that mental phenomena are real and distinct from the phenomena described by physical science, Bowes clarifies key commitments of embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive cognition (4EC). Proponents of these approaches to cognitive science will benefit from this book by sharpening their conceptual toolbox, while learning new tricks of how to disarm long-standing thorny theoretical conundrums.” (Tom Froese, Assistant Professor, Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate University, Japan)