To all philosophers who think they know how to formulate physicalism I recommend the book highly; for specialists I regard it as absolutely required reading. It is packed with challenging ideas and arguments. It is also well-organized, written in an easy, almost conversational style, and, apart from an occasional tendency to excessive concision, very clear. It would make an excellent main text for a graduate seminar.

Andrew Melnyk, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

This is a substantial book, rich with thought-provoking discussion and argumentation. I recommend it to anyone interested in consciousness, the debate between dualism and physicalism, and to anyone interested in the formulation and defense of physicalism. It explores deep problems and offers a compelling take on them. Though I do not completely agree with Kirk, his ideas are worthy of thorough consideration and discussion.

Shawn Bartlett, Dialogue: Candadian Philosophical Review

The book contains much that is both insightful and original; it deserves serious engagement from even the most sceptical quarters it is refreshing to read something so unswayed by philosophical fashion. . . . There is no space to provide even a perfunctory exposition here [of the arguments for ruling out zombies and transposed qualia]; I am confident they will be the target of critical papers and get the hearing they deserve. The more general approach to physicalism and logico-conceptual entailment here set out is more likely to be neglected by critics but I hope it is not.

D. Gene Witmer, Analysis Reviews

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The book is extremely rich in detail and thorough; ... and thereby should prove a welcome read not only for those seeking an introduction to Kirks brand of physicalism, but also to those who are independently interested in .. rival accounts. ... overall, if Kirk is right, what we gain is a coherent worldview that not only respects our intuitions, but which is ontologically parsimonious as well. A crucial read, then, for anyone interested in such a picture.

Raamy Majeed, Mind

What must be added to supervenience to ensure that the mental is nothing over and above the physical? Kirks answer that mental truths must be shown to be pure redescriptions of physical truths is extremely interesting, and strikes me as on the right track. ... I think this is an excellent and important book. It presents a novel and resourceful conception of physicalism, and defends it with admirable rigour.

Philip Goff, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

How are truths about physical and mental states related? Physicalism entails that non-physical truths are redescriptions of a world specifiable in narrowly physical terms. In The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental Robert Kirk argues that physicalists must therefore hold that the physical truth 'logico-conceptually' entails the mental truth: it is impossible for broadly logical and conceptual reasons that the former should have held without the latter. 'Redescriptive physicalism' is a fresh approach to the physical-to-mental connection that he bases on these ideas. Contrary to what might have been expected, this connection does not depend on analytic truths: there are holistic but non-analytic conceptual links, explicable by means of functionalism--which, he argues, physicalism entails. Redescriptive physicalism should not be confused with 'a priori physicalism': although physicalists must maintain that phenomenal truths are logico-conceptually entailed by physical truths, they must deny that they are also entailed a priori. Kripke-inspired 'a posteriori physicalism', on the other hand, is too weak for physicalism, and the psycho-physical identity thesis is not sufficient for it. Though non-reductive, redescriptive physicalism is an excellent basis for dealing with the problems that mental causation raises for other non-reductive views. 'Cartesian intuitions' of zombies and transposed qualia may seem to raise irresistible objections; Kirk shows that the intuitions are false. As to the 'explanatory gap', there is certainly an epistemic gap, but it has a physicalistically acceptable explanation which deals effectively with the problem of how the physical and functional facts fix particular phenomenal facts.
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How are truths about physical and mental states related? Robert Kirk articulates and defends 'redescriptive physicalism'--a fresh approach to the connection between the physical and the mental, which answers the problems that mental causation has traditionally raised for other non-reductive views.
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1. Introduction ; 2. Redescription and logico-conceptual entailment ; 3. Logico-conceptual entailment and other notions ; 4. Supervenience ; 5. Psycho-physical identity and functionalism ; 6. A posteriori physicalism - but not as we know it ; 7. A priori versus redescriptive physicalism ; 8. Redescription, reduction, and mental causation ; 9. Phenomenal truths are entailed logico-conceptually, but not a priori ; 10. Against the intuitions - and why it's like this ; Bibliography ; Index
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Major work from a leading expert in the field A novel approach to the relationship between the mind and body Outlines key criticisms and provides a powerful response to them
Robert Kirk is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nottingham. His other books are Translation Determined (OUP, 1986), Raw Feeling (OUP, 1994), Relativism and Reality (Routledge, 1999), Mind and Body (Acumen, 2003), and Zombies and Consciousness (OUP, 2005).
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Major work from a leading expert in the field A novel approach to the relationship between the mind and body Outlines key criticisms and provides a powerful response to them

Produktdetaljer

ISBN
9780199669417
Publisert
2013
Utgiver
Vendor
Oxford University Press
Vekt
518 gr
Høyde
240 mm
Bredde
162 mm
Dybde
20 mm
Aldersnivå
UP, 05
Språk
Product language
Engelsk
Format
Product format
Innbundet
Antall sider
242

Forfatter

Biographical note

Robert Kirk is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nottingham. His other books are Translation Determined (OUP, 1986), Raw Feeling (OUP, 1994), Relativism and Reality (Routledge, 1999), Mind and Body (Acumen, 2003), and Zombies and Consciousness (OUP, 2005).