Produktdetaljer
Biografisk notat
Paul Henne is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Neuroscience at Lake Forest College, USA.
Samuel Murray is Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department and Neuroscience Program at Providence College, USA.
This cutting-edge collection impressively covers a wide range of topics, ranging from free will and moral responsibility to monothematic delusions. There is something here for everyone with an interest in the philosophy of action – experimental or otherwise – and for everyone with an interest in the very lively field of experimental philosophy.
Alfred Mele, William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy, Florida State University, USA
This impressive volume makes a powerful case for the value of experimental philosophy of action by showcasing recent experimentally-informed work on free will, self-control, moral judgment, reasoning, assertion, and animal agency. It undeniably advances our understanding of some of the most interesting questions at the intersection of philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and the law.
Manuel Vargas, Professor of Philosophy, University of California San Diego, USA
This volume is a must for anyone interested in contemporary experimental work related to action theory. It beautifully illustrates ways in which a variety of experimental data can inform and constrain philosophical theorizing about action, normal and compromised agency, free will, ethics, and responsibility.
Adina L. Roskies, The Helman Family Distinguished Professor, Dartmouth College, USA
Many subfields in philosophy have profited from close engagement with relevant empirical sciences. With this volume, edited by Henne and Murray, philosophy of action takes a major step in this direction. These essays seamlessly weave together philosophical and empirical perspectives as they tackle core questions about agency.
Chandra Sripada, Professor of Philosophy and Psychiatry, University of Michigan, USA
What is self-control? Does a person need to be conscious to act? Are delusions always irrational? Questions such as these are fundamental for investigations into action and rationality, as well as how we assign responsibility for wrongdoing and assess clinical symptoms. Bridging the gap between philosophy and psychology, this interdisciplinary collection showcases how empirical research informs and enriches core questions in the philosophy of action.
Exploring issues such as truth, moral judgement, agency, consciousness and cognitive control, chapters offer an overview of the current state of research, present new empirical findings and identify where future experimental work can further advance the frontier between philosophy and psychology. This is an essential resource for anyone looking to better understand how science and philosophy can meaningfully inform our knowledge of human agency.
List of Figures
List of Tables
Notes on Contributors
Introduction to Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action, Samuel Murray and Paul Henne
1. Consciousness, Phenomenal Consciousness, and Free Will, Justin Sytsma and Melissa Snater
2. Skilled Action and Metacognitive Control, Myrto Mylopoulos
3. Bringing Self-Control into the Future, Samuel Murray
4. Who is Responsible? Split Brains, Dissociative Identity Disorder, and Implicit Attitudes, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
5. The Everyday Irrationality of Monothematic Delusion, Paul Noordhof and Ema Sullivan-Bissett
6. Truth, Perspective, and Norms Of Assertion: New Findings and Theoretical Advances, John Turri
7. The Distinct Functions of Belief and Desire in Intentional Action Explanation, Joanna Korman
8. Free Enough: Human Cognition (and Cultural Interests) Warrant Responsibility, Cory J Clark, Heather M Maranges, Brian B Boutwell, and Roy F Baumeister
9. Beyond the Courtroom: Agency and the Perception of Free Will, Edouard Machery, Markus Kneer, Pascale Willemsen, and Albert Newen
10. Do Rape Cases Sit in a Moral Blindspot? The Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgment and Rape, Katrina L. Sifferd
11. How People Think About Moral Excellence: The Role of Counterfactual Thoughts in Reasoning about Morally Good Actions, Shane Timmons and Ruth M.J. Byrne
12. Why Idealized Agency Gets Animal (and Human) Agency Wrong, Caroline T. Arruda and Daniel J. Povinelli
Index
Series Editor: Justin Sytsma is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.
Empirical and experimental philosophy is generating tremendous excitement, producing unexpected results that are challenging traditional philosophical methods. Advances in Experimental Philosophy responds to this trend, bringing together some of the most exciting voices in the field to understand the approach and measure its impact in contemporary philosophy. The result is a series that captures past and present developments and anticipates future research directions.
Editorial Board: James Andow (University of Manchester, UK), Florian Cova (University of Geneva, Switzerland), Masashi Kasaki (Nagoya University, Japan), Joshua Knobe (Yale University, USA), Jincai Li (Shanghai Jiao Tong University), Edouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh, USA), Thomas Nadelhoffer (College of Charleston, USA), Jennifer Nado (University of Hong Kong), Eddy Nahmias (Georgia State University, USA), Izabela Skoczen (Jagiellonian University), Noel Struchiner (Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), Pascale Willemsen (University of Zurich, Switzerland)
Produktdetaljer
Biografisk notat
Paul Henne is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Neuroscience at Lake Forest College, USA.
Samuel Murray is Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department and Neuroscience Program at Providence College, USA.